Coordination in groups faces a sub-optimization problem 1-6 and theory suggests that some randomness may help to achieve global optima [7] [8] [9] . Here we performed experiments involving a networked colour coordination game 10 in which groups of humans interacted with autonomous software agents (known as bots). Subjects (n = 4,000) were embedded in networks (n = 230) of 20 nodes, to which we sometimes added 3 bots. The bots were programmed with varying levels of behavioural randomness and different geodesic locations. We show that bots acting with small levels of random noise and placed in central locations meaningfully improve the collective performance of human groups, accelerating the median solution time by 55.6%. This is especially the case when the coordination problem is hard. Behavioural randomness worked not only by making the task of humans to whom the bots were connected easier, but also by affecting the gameplay of the humans among themselves and hence creating further cascades of benefit in global coordination in these heterogeneous systems.
Coordination in groups faces a sub-optimization problem [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and theory suggests that some randomness may help to achieve global optima [7] [8] [9] . Here we performed experiments involving a networked colour coordination game 10 in which groups of humans interacted with autonomous software agents (known as bots). Subjects (n = 4,000) were embedded in networks (n = 230) of 20 nodes, to which we sometimes added 3 bots. The bots were programmed with varying levels of behavioural randomness and different geodesic locations. We show that bots acting with small levels of random noise and placed in central locations meaningfully improve the collective performance of human groups, accelerating the median solution time by 55.6%. This is especially the case when the coordination problem is hard. Behavioural randomness worked not only by making the task of humans to whom the bots were connected easier, but also by affecting the gameplay of the humans among themselves and hence creating further cascades of benefit in global coordination in these heterogeneous systems.
Collective action and large-scale cooperation are important challenges [1] [2] [3] . Most work on cooperation has focused on the social dilemma aspect, namely, on getting people to be willing to make sacrifices for the greater good 11, 12 . Yet, even when this dilemma can be addressed, there remains another substantial problem: coordination [4] [5] [6] . The difficulty of achieving optimal collective action in groups may arise not only from the conflicting interests among individuals, or between individuals and their group, but also as a consequence of the inability of individuals to effectively coordinate their actions globally. Even if all individuals behave properly in their local interactions, this may not result in the optimal outcome for the whole community 1, 2 . Previous theoretical work has suggested a surprising, even paradoxical, solution to the coordination problem: adding 'noise' [13] [14] [15] . Noise is usually defined as meaningless information, and it is often seen as problematic 16 . When it comes to optimization, however, noise can help a system to reach a global optimum. For example, mutation has an essential role in evolution 17 ; error can facilitate search for information 18 ; random fish schooling may enhance survival 19 ; and cooperation may benefit from deviant behaviour [7] [8] [9] 20 . Here, we evaluate the benefits of noise in addressing the coordination problem of human groups 21, 22 . As human interactions are embedded within social networks, we also consider the impact of network position on the potentially beneficial effect of noise 23 . We first characterize the collective-action dynamics of networks of people interacting in a classic colour coordination game 10 . Then, we test the effect of noise on collective performance using autonomous software agents (bots), manipulating both the noisiness and geodesic placement of the bots. By adding bots into experimental social networks, we therefore explore the performance of heterogeneous systems involving both real humans and autonomous agents, while also demonstrating a possible practical solution to the problem of global coordination itself.
We recruited 4,000 unique subjects online and randomly assigned them to 1 of 11 conditions in a series of 230 sessions (see Supplementary Information). Subjects were assigned a location in a network of 20 nodes, generated by a preferential attachment model 24 ; the network structure was created de novo for each session by attaching new nodes (each with two links) to existing nodes; and subjects were placed into the resulting networks at random. The collective goal is for every node to have a colour different than all of its neighbour nodes 10 . This colour coordination game successfully captures the problem of systematic failure by sub-optimization in coordination; that is, while each individual attempts to reach a solution that is optimal for that individual, this may not be optimal for the whole group (Fig. 1a) .
In the sessions, each subject was allowed to choose a colour from three choices (green, orange and purple) at any time. The number of colours made available was the minimum necessary to colour the entire network without conflicts, which is known as the chromatic number; and all networks in our experiments are, by construction, globally solvable. However, while all the networks allowed the subjects to reach the collective goal, the networks could (by chance) vary in their number of solutions (that is, the networks ranged from 6 to 13,824 possible colourings that would work, known as the chromatic polynomial; see Supplementary Information).
Subjects could see only the colours of neighbours to whom they were directly connected, in addition to their own colour. Thus, although a subject might have solved the problem from his or her own point of view, the game might continue because the network still had conflicts in other regions of the graph. In terms of the optimization problem, the cost function of the game is expressed as the sum of the number of conflicts. As in past work 10 , the subjects got paid according to how long it took for all conflicts in the network to be resolved, and they had to complete the task within 5 min (see Supplementary Information for details).
Within this basic setup, we then introduced three bots into the network in exchange for the same number of humans (no bots were placed in the control sessions; see Supplementary Table 1) . Subjects were not informed that there were bots in the game. We manipulated the noisiness of the bots as follows. In the 'zero noise' condition, the bots behaved with a simple, greedy strategy: when a bot had a chance to minimize colour conflicts with its neighbours, it chose that colour; otherwise, it maintained its current colour. In the other two conditions, the bots behaved with the same greedy strategy most of the time, but they also randomly picked a colour from the three permissible options regardless of their local situation with either a probability of 10% ('small noise') or 30% ('large noise'). In all of the conditions, the bots made decisions every 1.5 s, which was the typical human reaction time (Extended Data Fig. 1 ).
Independent of bot noise, we also manipulated their network location as follows. In the 'central' condition, the bots were assigned to the three positions that had the largest number of neighbours (the highest network degree). Likewise, in the 'peripheral' condition, the bots were assigned to the three positions with the lowest degree.
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In the 'random' condition, the bots were randomly assigned to their network locations. It was permissible for the bots to be connected to each other, by chance, in all conditions.
As noted, the bots acted using only their local information. To assess the effect of such bot behaviour compared to the much more demanding case requiring global knowledge of the entire network structure and its solution space in advance, we also carried out experiments with a 'fixed colour' condition. In this extra condition, we evaluated all colour combinations of each network that resulted in no conflicts, and then assigned the initial colours of three of the nodes based on one of those combinations (chosen at random). That is, during the game, the three nodes were not controlled by bots that coordinated with their neighbours, but rather, these nodes simply stayed at their initial colours, which were known to be consistent with a global solution to the problem. We examined this treatment only in the case in which the fixed nodes were in the central location.
In summary, we evaluated 11 conditions: 1 control condition not involving any bots; 9 treatment combinations of noise and location of bots (3 levels of behavioural randomness (0%, 10% and 30%) crossed with 3 types of location (random, central and peripheral)), and 1 final condition with 3 fixed-colour nodes. We conducted 30 sessions for the control condition and 20 sessions for each of the treatment conditions for a total of 230 sessions and 4,000 subjects.
For the games involving only human subjects, 20 out of 30 resulted in an optimal colouring of the network in less than the allotted 5 min (median time = 232.4 s; interquartile range (IQR) 143.7-300.0). Although the subjects aimed to eliminate all the conflicts, they often found themselves unable to reach the collective goal only by reducing their local conflicts on an individual basis. For example, as of 105 s in Fig. 1a (or Supplementary Video 1) , each of the subjects had chosen one of the least common colours among their neighbours; that is, no one person could change their colour for the better. A conflict between neighbours, however, still remained. Such states in which players get caught in locally unresolvable conflicts are regarded as local minima of the cost function of the game (in contrast to resolvable conflicts that can be addressed by local action). Players would need a moderate level of deviancy from the norm of conflict minimization to overcome the local minimum and reach a global solution (for example, Fig. 1a, at 245 s) .
By analysing the sessions involving only human subjects, it is possible to discern that games were more likely to be solved when some players occasionally chose a locally inappropriate colour, temporarily increasing conflicts; moreover, the effect of such behavioural deviance varied according to the geodesic location of the players, as captured by their network degree (Fig. 1b) . In addition, and distinctly, some networks could be intrinsically easier to solve (that is, the chromatic polynomial could be higher) (Fig. 1c) .
To demonstrate how bots could improve the performance of human groups, Fig. 2 shows survival curves of the sessions involving the nine bot treatments. Before implementing pairwise comparisons of each treated group with the control group, we performed a log-rank test of the null hypothesis that all the survival curves are identical; that hypothesis was rejected (P = 0.024), indicating that at least two of the survival curves differed. The sessions having bots with 10% noise in central locations were the most likely to be solved within the allotted 5 min (17 out of 20 sessions, or 85%, compared with 20 out of the 30 control sessions, or 67%, with humans alone); moreover, the solution was achieved more than 129.3 s faster (that is, 55.6% faster) than sessions involving just humans (median time = 103.1 s (IQR 49.5-170.1) versus 232.4 s (IQR 143.7-300.0)), which was significantly better (P = 0.015, log-rank test). We then examined the difference in effectiveness of the various bot treatments, while furthermore controlling for the intrinsic solvability of the network, using Cox proportional hazard models. Bot behavioural randomness of 10%, central location, and the logarithm of the chromatic polynomial all have a significantly positive effect on the completion time (P < 0.05; n = 180 bot-treated sessions; see Supplementary Information). We also evaluated another metric of the complexity of the solution space (that is, mean convergence steps with linear probabilities) and got similar results (Extended Data Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 4 ). The statistical model with full interactions shows that the bots affect the solution time only when they behave with 10% randomness and are placed in the central location in the network (Fig. 3a) ; moreover, when the network affords many solutions, the beneficial impact of bots decreases, as shown by the three-way interaction (Fig. 3b) . In short, the bots are especially helpful when the network is globally hard to solve.
We found that the impact of 10%-noise bots was comparable to the impact of assigning three nodes with fixed (constant) colours in a configuration known ex ante to be compatible with a global solution. There was no significant difference between the sessions with 10%-noise bots and the sessions with fixed colours (P = 0.675, log-rank test). Thus, the intervention of the bots, based on local decision-making alone, is equally as effective as a pre-calculated solution that (in typical circumstances) impractically would require previous global knowledge of the entire network structure and its solution space.
The bots appear to have improved collective performance in part by changing the colour-conflict behaviours of human players in the whole system (Extended Data Fig. 3) . When placed at high-degree nodes, the bots with 0% behavioural randomness reduced the number of conflicts but they increased the duration of unresolvable conflicts; the bots with 30% randomness decreased the duration of unresolvable conflicts but increased overall conflicts; and only the bots with 10% randomness decreased both the number of conflicts and the duration of unresolvable conflicts, compared with the control sessions. By contrast, when placed at low-degree nodes, the bots were less likely to influence the entire network of humans, regardless of their noisiness.
When the bots were placed in high-degree positions, their behavioural randomness was able not only to facilitate the solution of their own conflicts, but also to nudge neighbouring humans to change their behaviour in ways that appear to have further facilitated a global solution. The bots with 0% behavioural randomness reduced the randomness of other human players (Fig. 4a) , which made the human players, particularly the middle-degree players, come to be stuck in unresolvable conflicts (Fig. 4d) . The bots with 30% behavioural randomness destabilized the entire network, including the low-degree players, who displayed more noise in their own actions (Fig. 4c) ; as a result, the sessions with 30%-noise bots showed the same level of unresolvable conflicts as those without bots (Fig. 4f) . The bots with 10% behavioural randomness increased the randomness of the central players but reduced that of the peripheral players (Fig. 4b) ; hence, through the influence of their behavioural randomness, the 10%-noise bots reduced the unresolvable conflicts not only of themselves but also of the entire network, including links between human subjects unconnected to the bots (Fig. 4e) . These results were obtained even though the subjects were, in fact, less and less satisfied with their counterparts the more noisy the bots became (Extended Data Fig. 4) .
In a separate, further experiment involving an additional 340 subjects and a matched set of n = 20 graphs, we found that these beneficial effects on group coordination and learning were obtained even when players knew they were interacting with bots (see Supplementary  Information) . The solution time was statistically indistinguishable (Extended Data Fig. 5 ) and the effect on players throughout the system was also similar (Extended Data Fig. 6 ).
Adding autonomous agents with simple strategies into social systems may make it easier for groups of humans to achieve global optima for complex group-wide tasks. Here, the setting was a global coordination game, but other settings might include cooperation, sharing or navigation 5, 12, 25 . Any such bots, however, might only be helpful if they have certain properties, including noisiness or particular geodesic locations. Indeed, like other situations 13, 14, 17, 18, 20 , some noise may be good from the point of view of the group. Moreover, bots with some noise, with solely local information, improved global outcomes here just as much as bots using global information acquired in advance. We find that these slightly noisy bots work not only by making the task of humans to whom they are connected easier, but also by affecting the game play of the humans themselves when they interact with still other humans in the group, thus creating cascades of benefit. And this happens even when people know they are interacting with bots. In this sense, even simple artificial intelligence (AI) agents can serve a teaching function, changing the strategy of their human counterparts and modifying human-human interactions, and not just affecting humanbot interactions. More generally, our work illustrates the performance of combined, heterogeneous groups composed neither solely of humans nor solely of robots attempting to coordinate their actions. Future work can explore even more realistic or complex interactions, such as military or commercial robots working within human groups, or autonomous vehicles moving in a world of human-driven cars.
Although laboratory experiments afford robust causal inference, they must sacrifice some realism and breadth. Guided by prior theory, we chose to focus on only two aspects of bot contributions (noise and placement) and their effect on one primary outcome (success of global coordination in a standard game 10 ). We also necessarily made other design choices, including using a scale-free network limited to 20 people (which was required if the games were to be tractable). But there are other features of social interactions that might affect the ability of groups to coordinate to solve a problem, such as group size, network topology 10 , and bot fraction; whether the networks are dynamic or static 26, 27 ; or whether social institutions (for example, policing, sanctions or norms) are present. These elements are important directions for future work. Adding bots of moderate noisiness to strategic positions within human networks might help to address diverse problems, especially when the particular coordination problem is hard. For example, narrowly focused workers might each labour to enhance their own productivity, but this might actually decrease overall company performance. Crowd-sourcing applications in science (such as solving quantum problems 28 or other types of 'citizen science' ranging from protein folding 29 to the assessment of archaeological or astronomical images) might be facilitated by adding some bots or noise to groups working collaboratively. Moreover, our work reinforces the idea that both simple and sophisticated AI might be useful. For instance, simple bots might help to reduce racist remarks online 30 . The simplicity and transparency of decision-making in simple AI of the kind we explore here might also make it intelligible to humans, thereby eliciting an effective, long-term relationship 11 . Simple autonomous agents, when mixed into complex social systems, might offer substantial advantages, and they could help groups of humans to help themselves.
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